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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-1367

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ex rel. SAM ADAM,

Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE RICHARD ELROD,
Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No. 73-1407, 73-1722, unpublished opinion, see 489 F. 2d 758 (1973), and *People of the State of Illinois* v. *Sam Adam,* 51 Ill. 2d 46, 280 N.E. 2d 205 (1972), appear in the Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

During the latter part of September and first week of October 1971, the Cook County, Illinois Grand Jury was in the process of investigating a murder charge.

Pursuant to that investigation the Grand Jury summoned before it one Shirley Walker who was represented by petitioner, Sam Adam.

Among various questions propounded, the Grand Jury inquired of Miss Walker when petitioner had become her attorney, under what circumstances petitioner was employed as her attorney, and the conversation which took place between herself, petitioner, and Mr. Pincham while the trio was enroute to the Criminal Courts Building in Chicago on September 28, 1971. Miss Walker answered all questions fully.

Subsequent to Miss Walker's appearance before the Grand Jury, petitioner was summoned before that body and asked the following three questions:

(1) When did you become the lawyer for Shirley Walker?

(2) Would you tell the Ladies and Gentlemen of the Grand Jury the circumstances surrounding your employment as Shirley Walker's lawyer?

(3) I ask you now, Mr. Adam, to inform this Grand Jury as to that conversation that took place

between you and Miss Walker and Mr. Pincham on Tuesday morning, September 28, 1971, as you were enroute here to the Criminal Courts Building in Mr. Pincham's car?

Petitioner refused to answer the questions claiming as justification for his refusal the attorney-client privilege. After several hearings were held before the Honorable Joseph Power, Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division for the Circuit Court of Cook County, petitioner was ordered to answer the questions of the Grand Jury. Petitioner again refused and was held in contempt. Petitioner was sentenced to ten days imprisonment on the Illinois work release program. An immediate request for bail by petitioner to the Illinois Supreme Court was granted and petitioner appealed the lower court's decision.

On appeal, petitioner submitted a written brief to the Illinois Supreme Court which contained within it numerous admissions that Shirley Walker had in fact answered the identical questions asked of petitioner. The Supreme Court decided and held that the privilege, if any existed, as to questions (1) and (3) were waived inasmuch as petitioner's client had communicated the information to the Grand Jury.

As to question (2), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded the contempt conviction for further proceedings. No additional proceedings as to question (2) have to date been initiated pending the outcome of the litigation before the Federal Courts.

Upon an adverse ruling before the Illinois Supreme Court, petitioner requested that court to order the production of the Grand Jury Minutes. This request was denied. No such request had been made prior to this time.

A petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied. *Adam* v. *Illinois,* 409 U.S. 984, 93 S. Ct. 289, 34 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1972).

Petitioner next filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. That court, the Honorable James B. Parsons presiding, held that question (1) was not within the privilege, but that question (3) did fall within the confines of a privileged communication. The District Court made no mention of waiver.

Petitioner and respondent appealed and cross-appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The Court of Appeals held that as to question (1) the decision of the district court was affirmed and as to question (3) the ruling of the lower court was reversed.

In sum, the Court of Appeals ruled that question (1) was not within the privilege and that any privilege which might have existed relative to question (3) was waived (thereby expressly agreeing with the Illinois Supreme Court). Question (2), having been reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court, was held not to be the subject matter of Federal Jurisdiction.

While petitioner did make a motion before the District Court for the production of the Grand Jury Minutes, petitioner never asked the District Court for a ruling.

No request for the Grand Jury Minutes was formally made to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Petitioner, in his petition for a Writ of Certiorari to this court, has enumerated various "facts" surrounding the Grand Jury inquiry in question.

Petitioner, in essence, accuses the State of deceit and harassment. This charge is vigorously and expressly denied.

As the record of the State proceedings reveals, (which, parenthetically, was available to and reviewed by the Illinois Supreme Court, United States District Court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit), Shirley Walker gave a statement relative to the homicide under Grand Jury scrutiny. This statement implicated several other individuals. Subsequent to this, Miss Walker changed her position and recanted her statement.

It had become apparent that Miss Walker had been in contact with several individuals during the interval of time between her statements. This prompted the Grand Jury to make inquiry into possible obstruction of justice charges.

Assistant State's Attorney Gino DiVito had on several occasions informed the Presiding Judge and Acting Presiding Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court, Criminal Division, that Miss Walker was not the subject of any possible indictment. In furtherance of this, Miss Walker was granted immunity from prosecution.

Only after Miss Walker had answered fully the questions now under review was the petitioner summoned before the Grand Jury.

Petitioner's reference to harassment is totally unfounded and unsupported by the record. Also, petitioner's statement that Miss Walker "escaped" is not factual. The record of State proceedings clearly indicates Miss Walker was not in custody during the time she testified before the Grand Jury, but instead was subpoenaed before that body. The State did provide her with a motel room at her request, but she was free to leave at any time.

REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner, in his petition for a Writ of Certiorari, essentially claims:

1) that he was not aware of the content of Miss Walker's testimony before the Grand Jury at the time Petitioner was called before the Jury, and therefore was not certain a waiver of the privilege had been accomplished;
2) that both the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Illinois Supreme Court improperly held the attorney-client privilege was waived without having reviewed Miss Walker's testimony;
3) that the question, "When did you become the lawyer for Shirley Walker?" falls within the attorney-client privilege.

These contentions are then applied to an allegation of Constitutional infringement.

Respondent directs this Court's attention to the following undisputed facts:

A) Petitioner never requested the Grand Jury Minutes until an adverse ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court. *People* v. *Adam,* 51 Ill. 2d 46, 280 N.E. 2d 205 (1972);
B) Petitioner, in his brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, fully admitted that Shirley Walker had in fact completely answered the identical questions asked of petitioner, and that petitioner was aware of her testimony;
C) Under Illinois procedural law, matters admitted by a party in his brief may be considered to be true. *Chance* v. *Kimbrell,* 376 Ill. 615, 617, 35 N.E. 2d 48, 49 (1941); *People* v. *Adam,* 51 Ill. 2d 46, 280 N.E. 2d 205 (1972).

In light of the above, petitioner's current claim that he was unaware of Miss Walker's testimony, and that the Court of Appeals and Illinois Supreme Court were incorrect in their respective decisions is incomprehensible.

However, petitioner's very contention was answered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:

> "Adam contends that this decision of the Illinois Supreme Court is erroneous since it overlooks the fact that he had never been allowed to read the transcript of Miss Walker's testimony at the grand jury. Without reading the transcript, it is argued, Adam could not know what his client had said and, therefore, there was no effective waiver of the privilege. This argument is without merit. Miss Walker's testimony as to the substance of her conversation with Adam waived her attorney-client privilege with respect to this communication. *United States* v. *Cote*, 456 F. 2d 142, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1972); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327 (McNaughton rev. 1961); McCormick, Evidence § 93 (2d ed. 1972). What she answered and whether her answer was truthful are irrelevant to the question of waiver. Equally irrelevant is the fact, as possibly it might be inferred, that Adam did not desire to testify in such a manner as to contradict any of the testimony of his client, Miss Walker. While such concern for the client's welfare may be laudable it does not reflect upon whether she waived the privilege, which is her privilege and not that of the lawyer. The crucial fact is that Miss Walker did testify concerning the conversation, thereby waiving any privilege which might have been attached thereto.
>
> Adam next contends that the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling on waiver was without foundation since that court did not read the grand jury transcript to determine that Miss Walker had, in fact, been asked and answered the exact questions put to Adam. In Ad-

am's brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, however, he stated that MissWalker had answered the very questions he was later asked.[4]

Under Illinois law, matters admitted by a party in his brief may be considered to be true. *Chance* v. *Kimbrell,* 376 Ill. 615, 617, 35 N.E. 2d 48, 49 (1941). Thus, in considering this case, the Illinois Supreme Court noted:

> 'The record before us does not contain the testimony of Shirley Walker before the grand jury. [Adam's] brief, however, states that in her testimony she told the grand jury when she employed [Adam] and also related the conversation held with [Adam] in Pincham's car while enroute from the latter's home to the Criminal Courts Building. It is also stated in [Adam's] brief that while she testified before the grand jury [Adam] waited outside the grand jury room and that she repeatedly left the grand jury room and conferred with [Adam]. . . . Under the circumstances shown we need not and do not decide whether the answers to the first and third questions are privileged, because, if so, the privilege was waived. *People* v. *Adam,* 51 Ill. 2d 46, 48-49, 280 N.E. 2d 205, 207 (1972)'

The Illinois practice of considering admissions of a party in his brief as true is not so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process, and, therefore, the procedure is not proper subject of review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. *United States ex rel. McCray* v. *Rundle,* 422 F. 2d 354, 356 (3rd Cir. 1970).

In sum, we agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that, even if the answer to question 3 was privileged (a matter which we assume *arguendo* but did not decide), that privilege was waived when Miss Walker testified as to the substance of the conversation involved. The fact that, procedurally, the Illinois Supreme Court arrived at this decision partly on the

basis of admissions in Adam's brief to that court is not properly reviewable by this court in a habeas corpus proceeding." *United States ex rel. Sam Adam* v. *Richard Elrod,* unpublished opinion 489 F. 2d 758 (See appendix at pp. 18-21)

In footnote 4 of the Court of Appeals decision, that Court quoted portions of Adam's brief:

"4. The following statements appeared in Adams's brief to the Illinois Supreme Court:

"Shirley Walker testified before the Grand Jury that she knew of and had heard about Attorney Sam Adam. . . . She telephonically conferenced with Mr. Adam at his office [on September 27, 1971] and was told by him to meet him at Attorney Pincham's home the following morning. She testified that she did so, and that she and Attorneys Adam and Pincham rode from the latter's home in his car to the Criminal Court Building. She was asked and she told the Grand Jury the conversations that were had in the car en route to the Criminal Court Building. She answered all questions put to her on her attorney-client relationship and on all her conferences and conversations with her attorney, Sam Adam. . . . Attorney Sam Adam counseled with Shirley Walker immediately outside the Grand Jury room during her Grand Jury testimony. . . . Assistant State's Attorney DiVito asked Attorney Sam Adam about his attorney-client relationship with Shirley Walker, the facts and circumstances of him becoming her attorney, his meeting with her at Attorney Pincham's home, their coming to the Criminal Court Building together, and the conversations in the car en route to the Criminal Court Building, (R. 36), *the very same questions which had been asked of and answered by Shirley Walker.*" Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 20-21, in *People* v. *Adam,* 51 Ill. 2d 46, 280 N.E. 2d 205 (1972) (Emphasis added.)" *United States ex rel. Sam Adam* v. *Richard Elrod,* supra, footnote 4, (See Appendix at pp. 19-20)

Respondent posits that an examination of the instant cause now before this court, as presented by petitioner, discloses that a factual question (Was Sam Adam aware of Miss Walker's testimony before the Grand Jury?) was resolved via admissions in Petitioner's Brief to the Illinois Supreme Court.

Thus, Respondent respectfully submits, the issues presented are not of sufficient import for a Writ of Certiorari to be ordered by the United States Supreme Court.

In support of Respondent's assertion, this Court's attention is directed to the following:

I. Petitioner never has and could not claim that the attorney-client privilege cannot be waived. *Hunt* v. *Blackburn,* 128 U.S. 125, 32 L. Ed 488, 9 S. Ct. 125 (1888); *Schwimmer* v. *United States,* 232 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); *United States* v. *Jacobs,* 322 F. Supp. 1299 (C.D. Calif. 1971). It is hornbook law that the privilege rests with the client and not the attorney.

II. Petitioner has never contested the fact that a procedural law of a State is not the proper subject of review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. *United States ex rel. McCray* v. *Rundle,* 422 F. 2d 354, 356 (3rd Cir. 1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966). Therefore, the action of the Illinois Supreme Court in accepting Petitioner's admissions as true, does not present a federal question subject to review.

III. Petitioner has not cited, nor is Respondent aware of, any decisions by the United States Supreme Court which are out of harmony with the United States Court of Appeals or Illinois Supreme Court decisions now under review.

IV. The instant cause does not in any way present a question of transcending public importance, nor does the Court of Appeals or Illinois Supreme Court decisions, now under review, in any

fashion present a precedent with far reaching effects for future litigation.

V. The instant case is clearly not an instance where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not previously decided by the United States Supreme Court.

VI. The instant cause does not present a situation where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision now under review is in conflict with another Federal Court of Appeals on the same matter.

VII. This case does not present an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be settled by the United States Supreme Court.

VIII. There has been no showing by Petitioner of a departure by either court (Illinois Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals) from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, nor has any showing been made to justify the United States Supreme Court's power of supervision.

Finally, petitioner's contention that the question, "When did you become the lawyer for Shirley Walker?" is within the attorney-client privilege is frivolous. Such an inquiry goes only to the date such a relationship was created. The question does not call for the disclosure of a communication. *Behrens* v. *Hironimus,* 170 F. 2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948).

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that this court deny Petitioner's request for a Writ of Certiorari, and all other relief requested.

Respectfully submitted,

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Cook County, Illinois,
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Chicago, Illinois 60602,

Attorney for Respondent.

PATRICK T. DRISCOLL, JR.,
RONALD F. NEVILLE,
Assistant State's Attorneys,
Of Counsel.

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 2, 1973
December 28, 1973

Before

Hon. LUTHER M. SWYGERT, Chief Judge
Hon. JOHN S. HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge
Hon. WILBUR F. PELL, JR., Circuit Judge

Nos. 73-1407, 73-1722

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. SAM ADAM, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RICHARD ELROD, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, Respondent.	Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 72 C 2853 James B. Parsons, *Judge*

This is an appeal by both parties from the district court's decision as to whether the answers to certain proposed questions at a grand jury proceeding were encompassed by the attorney-client privilege. Petitioner Sam Adam was the attorney representing one Shirley Walker when the latter was subpoenaed to testify before the Cook County grand jury. Adam was later called to testify before the same grand jury, at which time he refused to answer the

following questions on the ground that the information sought was protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege:

(1) When did you become the lawyer for Shirley Walker?

(2) Would you tell the Ladies and Gentlemen of the Grand Jury the circumstances surrounding your employment as Shirley Walker's lawyer?

(3) I now ask you, Mr. Adam, to inform this Grand Jury as to that conversation that took place between you and Miss Walker and Mr. Pincham on Tuesday morning, September 28, 1971, as you were enroute here to the Criminal Courts Building in Mr. Pincham's car?

Adam was ordered to answer these questions by the state circuit court but he again refused. The circuit court found the refusal to answer to be contemptuous and imposed sentence.

Adam appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.[1] That court affirmed the circuit court's order as to the questions 1 and 3. With regard to the second question, the Illinois Supreme Court found the record inadequate to determine whether there had been a waiver of the privilege by Miss Walker. The circuit court's judgment as to question 2 was, therefore, reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. *People* v. *Adam*, 51 Ill. 2d 46, 280 N.E. 2d 205, *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).

Adam then filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the district court. The district court dismissed the peti-

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1. An original action in habeas corpus was consolidated with that appeal.

tion, stating that question 1 was not within the attorney-client privilege,[2] although question 3 was privileged. The state appeals from the district court's ruling as to question 3 and Adam cross-appeals on the court's ruling on question 1.

Question 1

The attorney-client privilege is generally limited to communications between the client and attorney. The privilege thus does not extend to the fact that the attorney-client relationship has arisen, the identity of the client, or the date when the relationship began, since these matters involve no disclosure of communications.

> "[A]lthough the word 'communications' must be broadly interpreted in this context, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2306 (McNaughton rev. 1961), the authorities are clear that the privilege extends essentially only to the substance of matters communicated to an attorney in professional confidence. Thus the identity of a client, or the fact that a given individual has become a client are matters which an attorney normally may not refuse to disclose, even though the fact of having retained counsel may be used as evidence against the client." *Colton* v. *United States*, 306 F. 2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), *cert. denied*, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
>
> * * *
>
> "Those questions which pertain to the *date* and general nature of the legal services performed by [the attorney] for [the client] should be answered as they do

2. The district court also ruled that question 2 was not within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Both parties, however, expressly agreed in oral argument before this court that no appeal was being taken with respect to the second question as it was not properly before the federal courts.

> not call for any confidential communication." *Id.* at 636. (Emphasis added.)

See also, *In re Semiel,* 411 F. 2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1969), *cert. denied,* 396 U.S. 905; *National Union Fire Ins. Co.* v. *Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,* 384 F. 2d 316, 317 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1967); *United States* v. *Kendrick,* 331 F. 2d 110, 113-14 (4th Cir. 1964).

The question "When did you become the lawyer for Shirley Walker?" merely required that Adam disclose a date. Adam was not asked by this question to reveal any matter communicated to him by his client. As the district court noted:

> "[I]t is simple logic which compels me to find and hold, as I now do, that the date, place and identifying circumstances of the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship is innocent and highly relevant to the issue of whether or not there existed such a relationship at all in the first place." *United States ex rel. Adam* v. *Elrod,* No. 72 C 2853 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 26, 1973) (oral opinion).

We agree with the district court that a question which simply asked for the date upon which the attorney was retained by the client was not encompassed by the attorney-client privilege. Adam, therefore, could not properly claim the protection of the privilege.

Question 3

Determining whether the information sought by the third question is privileged is less easy of resolution. The state contends that the conversation referred to in the question is not privileged since Mr. Pincham, a third person, was present during the conversation. We agree that generally the presence of a third party who is not the agent of either the attorney or the client destroys the privilege. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2311 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

Adam contends, however, that the particular circumstances of the present case should place it within an exception to this general rule. Mr. Pincham was not, Adam argues, an adverse, or even disinterested third party. Instead, he argues, Mr. Pincham was the attorney who, although not representing Miss Walker, had referred her to Adam. In addition, Mr. Pincham has worked with Adam on a number of cases. The crucial test, it is argued, for determining whether a third person's presence destroys the privilege, is whether the circumstances, viewed as a whole, imply that the conversation between the client, the attorney, and the third person was intended to be confidential. The district court, adopting this reasoning, held the answer to the third question to be privileged:

> "[T]he attorney-client privilege in criminal cases is not to be narrowly construed but broadly construed, so broadly construed that it does not adopt the corollary that disclosure to a third party necessarily eliminates the confidential nature of the correspondence between attorney and client. . . . In many instances it would not. . . . [T]he nature of [the] confidentiality here may in fact have involved Mr. Pincham to the extent that he, too, even though not in fact the retained counsel, has an interest in Shirley Walker; if nothing else, then the interest comes from being a colleague or associate of her attorney, or interest with a relation to other parties involved in the litigation . . ." *United States ex rel. Adam* v. *Elrod*, No. 72 C 2853 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 26, 1973) (Oral opinion).

It is not difficult to conceive of factual situations in which the confidentiality premise upon which the privilege is based would not be destroyed by the presence of one or several persons other than the lawyer to whom the communication was being made. The difficulty here is that of ascertaining just what the intertwining relationship of

Attorney Pincham was to Miss Walker during the conversation in the automobile. While it might be guessed that Mr. Pincham was present in some capacity to do with Miss Walker's legal interests other than that of chauffeur, a guess even though an educated one is not a substitute for record facts. Petitioner's brief in this court states: "It was on the advice of Mr. Pincham, that Miss walker retained the Petitioner as counsel." No record citation, however, is given.

We need not, however, speculate on whether there was a sufficient basis for finding the privilege inviolate notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Pincham. Instead, we, as did the Illinois Supreme Court, will assume *arguendo* that the privilege was not destroyed. Upon so doing we also agree with that court that the privilege was waived.[3]

Adam contends that this decision of the Illinois Supreme Court is erroneous since it overlooks the fact that he had never been allowed to read the transcript of Miss Walker's testimony at the grand jury. Without reading the transcript, it is argued, Adam could not know what his client had said and, therefore, there was no effective waiver of the privilege. This argument is without merit. Miss Walker's testimony as to the substance of her conversation with Adam waived her attorney-client privilege with respect to this communication. *United States* v. *Cote*, 456 F. 2d 142, 144-145 (8th Cir. 1972); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327 (McNaughton rev. 1961); McCormick, Evidence § 93 (2d ed. 1972). What she answered and whether her answer was truthful are irrelevant to the question of waiver. Equally irrelevant is the fact, as possibly it might be inferred, that

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3. We note that the district court did not, after finding the conversation to be privileged, expressly determine whether this privilege had been waived by Miss Walker.

Adam did not desire to testify in such a manner as to contradict any of the testimony of his client, Miss Walker. While such concern for the client's welfare on the part of the attorney may be laudable, it does not reflect upon whether she waived the privilege, which is her privilege and not that of the lawyer. The crucial fact is that Miss Walker did testify concerning the conversation, thereby waiving any privilege which might have been attached thereto.

Adam next contends that the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling on waiver was without foundation since that court did not read the grand jury transcript to determine that Miss Walker had, in fact, been asked and answered the exact questions put to Adam. In Adam's brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, however, he stated that Miss Walker had answered the very questions he was later asked.[4] Under

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4. The following statements appeared in Adam's brief to the Illinois Supreme Court:

"Shirley Walker testified before the Grand Jury that she knew of and had heard about Attorney Sam Adam. . . . She telephonically conferenced with Mr. Adam at his office [on September 27, 1971] and was told by him to meet him at Attorney Pincham's home the following morning. She testified that she did so, and that she and Attorneys Adam and Pincham rode from the latter's home in his car to the Criminal Court Building. She was asked and she told the Grand Jury the conversations that were had in the car en route to the Criminal Court Building. She answered all questions put to her on her attorney-client relationship and on all her conferences and conversations with her attorney, Sam Adam. . . . Attorney Adam counseled with Shirley Walker immediately outside the Grand Jury room during her Grand Jury testimony. . . . Assistant State's Attorney DiVito asked Attorney Adam about

Illinois law, matters admitted by a party in his brief may be considered to be true. *Chance* v. *Kimbrell,* 376 Ill. 615, 617, 35 N.E. 2d 48, 49 (1941). Thus, in considering this case, the Illinois Supreme Court noted:

> "The record before us does not contain the testimony of Shirley Walker before the grand jury. [Adam's] brief, however, states that in her testimony she told the grand jury when she employed [Adam] and also related the conversations held with [Adam] in Pincham's car while enroute from the latter's home to the Criminal Courts Building. It is also stated in [Adam's] brief that while she testified before the grand jury [Adam] waited outside the grand jury room and that she repeatedly left the grand jury room and conferred with [Adam]. . . . Under the circumstances shown we need not and do not decide whether the answers to the first and third questions are privileged, because, if so, the privilege was waived." *People* v. *Adam,* 51 Ill. 2d 46, 48-49, 280 N.E. 2d 205, 207 (1972).[5]

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his attorney-client relationship with Shirley Walker, the facts and circumstances of him becoming her attorney, his meeting with her at Attorney Pincham's home, their coming to the Criminal Court Building together, and the conversations in the car en route to the Criminal Court Building, (R. 36), *the very same questions which had been asked of and answered by Shirley Walker.*" Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 20-21, in *People* v. *Adam,* 51 Ill. 2d 46, 280 N.E. 2d 205 (1972) (Emphasis added.)

5. We note that the Illinois Supreme Court found that any privilege attached to question 1, as well as to question 3, had been waived by Miss Walker in answering these questions at the grand jury. However, since we found that the information sought by question 1 was clearly not covered by the attorney-client privilege, we do not deem it necessary to consider the waiver issue with respect to the first question.

The Illinois practice of considering admissions of a party in his brief as true is not so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process, and, therefore, the procedure is not the proper subject of review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. *United States ex rel. McCray* v. *Rundle*, 422 F. 2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1970).

In sum, we agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that, even if the answer to question 3 was privileged (a matter which we assumed *arguendo* but did not decide), that privilege was waived when Miss Walker testified as to the substance of the conversation involved. The fact that, procedurally, the Illinois Supreme Court arrived at this decision partly on the basis of admissions in Adam's brief to that court is not properly reviewable by this court in a habeas corpus proceeding.

For the reasons hereinbefore set out, the decision of the district court is affirmed as to Question 1 and reversed as to Question 3.[6]

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6. The foregoing decisional disposition of this case was based upon the posture of the case as presented to us by the parties in their briefs and oral arguments. Subsequent to the preparation of the foregoing order but prior to its release we have noted aspects of the case which cause us to question what the exact status of the proceedings in the district court is.

While both parties purported to appeal from action of the district court, neither party in his brief refers to an appeal from a judgment of the district court but rather each requests that we affirm or reverse a "ruling" of the court, a judicial bird of somewhat uncertain status insofar as it accords appellate jurisdiction.

The civil docket maintained in the office of the clerk of the district court does not throw much additional illumination on the subject. We note the following entries:

"2-26-73: Respondent's motion to dismiss, is allowed. The Petition for writ of habeas corpus herein, is ordered dismissed.

"3-8-73: Filed respondent's Notice of Appeal.

"3-27-73: Filed Petitioner's Notice of Appeal.

"3-23-73: Filed Petitioner's Mot n Requesting Issuance of Certificate of Probable Cause.

"3-23-73: This cause coming before this Honorable Court, after the denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, and pursuant to petitioner's motion for issuance of a certificate of probable cause; This court hereby finds that the petition for a writ of heabeas [sic] corpus contains a substantial federal question and, therefore, issues a certificate of probable cause, in the instatant [sic] cause.

"3-30-73: It is hereby ordered that the parties in the case of People of the State of Illinois v. Sam Adam, No. 71A35, now pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County are hereby stayed from proceedings in said case for a period of 20 days.

"5-7-73: It is hereby ordered that the parties in the case of People vs. Sam Adam, No. 71 A 35, now pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County are hereby stayed from proceedings in said case for a period of 10 additional days from date hereof."

In the appendix filed with this appeal no final judgment is set forth, but the last item in the appendix is a transcript of proceedings in the district court on February 26, 1973. This item was an extended colloquy in which the court announced, *inter alia*, its determination of the issue before it.

The following passages are noted:

"For all the matters above expressed, but for the very limited purposes above stated, the motion of the respondent should be, and the same hereby is, allowed.

The petition is dismissed and subject to the supplemental matters, the cause before me is closed.

* * *

"As to the third question, it is my finding as I have said, that that question in the circumstances under which I saw it, I viewed it, ought not to have been asked and, therefore, need not have been answered.

* * *

"Well, gentlemen, I have read my decision in the record. I have entered my final order. I will enter a supplemental order staying — what is it — just a stay order?

* * *

"THE COURT: That is a supplemental order. I have a final order allowing your [respondent's] motion to dismiss. I have a finding that one of the questions he was correct in not answering, the disclosure of the conversation; as to the two questions, that they were basic and harmless and should have been answered.

* * *

"MR. ADAM: The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed as to two but reversed one question. Now you have ruled that one of the questions should have been answered and one should not have been answered so—

* * *

"MR. ADAM: As to those two questions they said my refusal to answer those two questions was unjustified.

"THE COURT: Well, I differ with them.

"MR. ADAM: I know you do, on one of the two.

"THE COURT: The most important question is the question of your conversation with your client. I differ that the lawyer-client privilege is that narrowly handled in criminal cases."

In sum, we appear to have what purports to be a final disposition in that the motion of the respondent to dismiss was "allowed" without qualification. Yet the court in colloquy appears to have ruled with the petitioner as to one of the challenged questions. Notwithstanding references in the colloquy to finality, the court proceeded to grant stays subsequent to the filing of notices of appeal.

To resolve the apparently questionable status of the appellate proceedings and to move the litigation on its course, we therefore hold that if a final appealable judgment has been entered in the district court the foregoing order will stand as written. If, as it could be argued, there was a final judgment but that judgment was a sustaining of the motion to dismiss the petition in toto (which would scarcely seem to reflect the district court's thinking) then the judgment is affirmed.

If, on the other hand, there is no final judgment then we will treat the matter as an interlocutory order below. On that basis, we note that the district court did grant a certificate of probable cause on the basis that there was a substantial federal question. (It, of course, was not necessary for the representative of the state to secure a certificate of probable cause).* While not in strict compliance with the guidelines laid down in 28 U.S.C. § 1291(b), we think there is sufficient compliance with that subsection that we will handle the matter thereunder, entertain the appeal and upon so doing enter the foregoing opinion as to the law and remand for further proceedings in accordance therewith.

*Rule 22(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Appellee,

v. SAM ADAM, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 28, 1972.—Rehearing denied March 29, 1972.

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Sam Adam, appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County adjudging him in contempt of court and sentencing him to 10 days in the House of Correction. We allowed his motion for leave to file an original action in *habeas corpus* and have consolidated the original action and the appeal for consideration and opinion.

The record shows that Shirley Walker was called to testify before the September, 1971, Cook County grand jury which was investigating an alleged obstruction of justice in a police investigation of a murder. Defendant Adams, Miss Walker's attorney, was called to testify before the same grand jury. He testified that he was her attorney and, although ordered to do so by the circuit court, he refused to answer the following questions:

"1. When did you become the lawyer for Shirley Walker?

2. Would you tell the Ladies and Gentlemen of the Grand Jury the circumstances surrounding your employment as Shirley Walker's lawyer?

3. I now ask you, Mr. Adam, to inform this Grand Jury as to that conversation that took place between you and Miss Walker and Mr. Pincham on Tuesday morning, September 28, 1971, as you were

enroute here to the Criminal Courts Building in Mr. Pincham's car?"

Defendant refused to answer the questions primarily on the ground that to do so would result in the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, and secondarily on the ground that there was no showing of probable cause for "invading and violating his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person against unreasonable search and seizure." The circuit court found his refusal to answer to be contemptuous, imposed sentence, and these proceedings followed.

We consider first defendant's contention based upon the alleged violation of his rights under the fourth amendment. Although the authorities cited by the defendant tend to support his argument that an overly broad *subpoena duces tecum* may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure impermissible under the fourth amendment, we find no authority for the proposition that a grand jury must have probable cause to subpoena a witness to testify. We hold, therefore, that insofar as defendant's refusal to testify was based on the constitutional argument, the circuit court did not err in ordering him to answer the questions.

Defendant contends that all of the matters within the scope of the three questions which he refused to answer are protected from compulsory disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The People contend that assuming, *arguendo,* that the matters about which defendant was interrogated were privileged, Miss Walker had already testified regarding them and the privilege was thereby waived. Defendant argues that because Miss Walker had been granted immunity, her testimony was compelled and involuntary, and there was, therefore, no waiver of the privilege.

The attorney-client privilege exists in order that one who is, or seeks to become a client, may consult freely with counsel without fear of compelled disclosure of information communicated by him to the attorney whom he has employed, or seeks to employ. The essentials of its creation and continued existence have been defined as follows: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived." 8 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).

Counsel have not cited nor has our research revealed a case involving the precise issue here presented. We have examined a number of authorities, many of them conflicting, and conclude that the fact that Miss Walker testified after a grant of immunity and under compulsion is not dispositive of the issue of waiver. Under modern procedures process is available, with rare exception, to compel attendance of witnesses either in court or for deposition and in that sense, most testimony is given under compulsion. The decisive factor, therefore, is whether the privilege was timely asserted by the client for whose protection it exists.

The record before us does not contain the testimony of Shirley Walker before the grand jury. Defendant's brief, however, states that in her testimony she told the grand jury when she employed defendant, and also related the conversations held with defendant in Pincham's car while enroute from the latter's home to the Criminal Courts Building. It is also stated in defendant's brief that while she testified before the grand jury defendant waited outside the grand jury room and that she repeatedly left

the grand jury room and conferred with defendant. Defendant does not argue that Shirley Walker was not aware of, and could not, therefore, waive the attorney-client privilege. Under the circumstances shown we need not and do not decide whether the answers to the first and third questions are privileged, because if so, the privilege was waived.

The second question presented an issue more difficult of resolution. Defendant's brief states that Miss Walker testified that she had heard of defendant and that she called his office and spoke with him, arranged to meet him, and retained him. None of these matters are privileged because the privilege applies only to communications made by Miss Walker to defendant. It cannot be determined from the record and briefs whether there were in fact privileged matters communicated to the defendant, and if so, in whose presence, and for what purpose, nor can it be determined whether Miss Walker testified to any such communications. Whether a series of questions might have covered matters, some privileged and some not, is pure conjecture. Under the circumstances, in refusing to answer the question in the form in which it was propounded, we are unable to say defendant was in contempt.

For the reasons herein set forth the petition for a writ of *habeas corpus* is denied. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County adjudging the defendant guilty of contempt for refusal to answer questions 1 and 3 is affirmed, and as to question 2 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part and remanded, and writ quashed.